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The Growth of Participant Direction in Defined Contribution Plans 
 
Since 1990, most pension plans have shifted the responsibility for directing pension assets to 
the employee. This study summarizes some of the possible explanations for this rapid shift 
toward participant direction and uses IRS Form 5500 data to investigate the effect of worker 
and plan characteristics on the likelihood of making a switch. The study also estimates the 
effect of a switch to participant direction on employee contribution and asset allocation 
behavior. The analysis reveals that collective bargaining and pension investments in 
employer stock reduce the chance of a switch to participant direction, whereas below 
average return performance increases the chance. Also, a switch to participant direction 
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  Twenty years ago, the vast majority of defined contribution pension plans in the United 
States were managed by trustees on behalf of the plan participants.  However, there has been a 
complete reversal of this in the past 20 years.  Between 1988 and 2005, the percentage of defined 
contribution (DC) participants who manage some or all of the assets in their pension rose from 
15 to 86 percent.     
  This rapid shift in the responsibility for investing the pension contributions raises several 
questions.   First, what led firms to hand control over to the participants?   Second, what are the 
consequences of this shift in responsibility for important pension metrics like contribution levels, 
asset allocation, and rate of return? 
  While there has been some research on the question of how participant direction affects 
asset allocation and contribution levels, there has been virtually no research on why firms 
switched to participant direction.    Our study achieves two objectives.  First, using data from 
IRS Form 5500 filings between 1988 and 2005, we provide insights into the types of worker and 
plan characteristics that influence a firm’s decision to switch to participant direction.   Second, 
we exploit panel features of our data to revisit some of the questions addressed in earlier studies 
with respect to the impact of participant direction on contributions and asset management.   
  
II.  Background. 
 
  The research on participant direction of DC plans is relatively limited.   One line of 
research investigates how a shift to participant direction affects asset allocation decisions and 
contribution levels.   Papke (1998, 2003a) finds that participant direction increases the share of 
assets invested in equities.   Weisbenner (2002) finds that participant direction increases worker 3 
 
equity holdings outside of  their pension plans, perhaps because workers who direct their pension 
plan invest in financial knowledge.   Papke (2003a, b) also finds evidence that participant 
direction increases employee participation and contribution rates in pension plans.   These 
findings have obvious implications for the impact of the growth in participant direction on future 
retirement income security. 
  Another line of inquiry examines whether workers have sufficient financial knowledge to 
properly manage their pension funds and finds some evidence of poor decision making by 
workers.   For example, when an employer makes matching contributions in the form of 
employer stock, some employees make poor diversification decisions by investing their own 
contributions in the same stock.
1   Yet other employees may pursue a naive “1/n” diversification 
strategy and invest equal shares in all the investment options offered by the pension plan.
2    
Other research suggests that workers rarely reallocate their pension investments and may 
overreact to recent stock performance when making investment decisions.
3    
An important question that has not been addressed in the existing literature is why firms 
have switched to participant direction.   While there has been some speculation as to the 
underlying causes, we are unaware of any empirical work that focuses on this question 
specifically.  To guide the discussion, we first delineate some of the costs and benefits of a 
switch to participant direction and then describe several factors that may have caused the net 
benefits of participant directed plans to rise. 
                                                 
1See Benartzi (2001), Liang and Weisbrenner (2002), and Brown et al. (2004).   
 
2Benartzi and Thaler (2001) and  Agnew (2001) both find evidence of 1/n investment behavior.   Huberman and 
Jiang, (2004) find that investors do not exhibit 1/n behavior. 
 
3Benartzi (2001) and Sengmuller (2002)  discuss the effect of recent stock performance on investment behavior;  
Samuelson and Zechkhauser (1988) and Americks and Zeldes (2001)  show that portfolio rebalancing is infrequent. 
 4 
 
There are several potential benefits to giving employees control over the investment of 
pension assets.  First, it allows employees to tailor their investments to their own risk preferences 
and adjust the mix of assets for life-cycle considerations.   To the extent that the employees 
prefer this over a centrally managed account, their valuation of the pension rises and the firm can 
pay their workers lower wages and still remain competitive in the labor market. Second, if the 
firm satisfies certain requirements (described below), a switch to participant direction can protect 
the employer from charges of fiduciary neglect if the pension performs poorly.    
  A switch to participant direction is not without its shortcomings.  First, individual 
accounts are more expensive to administer than group accounts.   This could be especially 
important for pensions where the typical account balance is small since some of the 
administrative expenses (e.g. record keeping) are fixed per participant and could have substantial 
negative effects on the rate of return.   In fact, the administrative expenses associated with 
individual accounts have been highlighted as one of the potential shortcomings of Social 
Security privatization.
4    
  A second potential shortcoming of a switch to participant direction is that participants 
may lack the financial sophistication required to adequately manage their own pension funds and 
actually prefer that the funds be managed by a professional.    
  Finally, if employers make contributions of their own stock to the pension plan in an 
attempt to align employee incentives with firm performance, or to help reduce the chances of a 
hostile take-over, a shift toward participant direction may mean that employees may shed the 
employer stock.   While this may improve the diversification properties of the pension portfolio, 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Page (2004). 5 
 
there could be offsetting losses to the employer in terms of higher agency costs or the increased 
threat of a take-over.   
With the above benefits and costs in mind, we propose two explanations for the growth in 
participant direction:  (1) regulatory changes that allowed employers to insulate themselves from 
fiduciary liability if employees made poor investment decisions; and (2) technological change 
that reduced the additional administrative cost associated with management of individual 
accounts.    
  Under section 404(a) of the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) 
passed in 1974, the pension sponsor (employer) is given the obligation to prudently select and 
monitor pension offerings to ensure a diverse selection of investment alternatives and can be held 
liable for the investment decisions of employees.   Section 404(c) of ERISA, finalized in 1992, 
allows employers to transfer legal responsibility for losses resulting from a participant’s exercise 
of control over his or her account if the plan sponsor meets certain conditions.   To receive 
protection,  the pension must (1) offer a broad range of investment alternatives; (2) give 
participants sufficient control over asset allocation decisions (i.e. an ability to frequently 
reallocate);  and (3) distribute sufficient information about the investment choices (i.e. provide  
prospectuses for all the investment alternatives).   These regulations reduced the uncertainty 
regarding employer liability for participant decisions and, as suggested by Papke (2003a, b), may 
have contributed to employers’ increased willingness to give employees’ control over their 
pension assets. 
  Technological advances may have provided additional stimulus for participant direction 
[Kaplan 2003].   Advances in computing technology made daily trading and valuation less costly 
and made it easier for employers to comply with 404(c) requirements.  The concurrent growth of 6 
 
mutual funds that provided low cost methods for diversifying, even with small asset holdings, 
provided yet another reason to shift towards participant direction.  
While clarification of section 404(c) requirements and technological advances may have 
contributed to the rise in participant direction, the extent to which employees in a particular plan 
pressure the firm for a switch to participant direction should depend upon the financial 
sophistication of the employees and how well the plan performed relative to the market.    A 
more financially sophisticated group of workers would be more likely to want to control their 
own investments while others may prefer to have a trustee manage the funds for them.   At the 
same time, if a pension has underperformed relative to the market, workers may become 
unhappy with the returns and pressure the firm to give them control of the investment decisions.  
For example, Elswick (2002) describes the pressure on unionized plans to convert to participant 
direction during the 1990s.    The trustees in a typical union plan allocated nearly 75% of assets 
in fixed income options and 25% in equities and were earning single-digit returns.   The 
investment allocation was described as a good fit for retirees and conservatively-minded 
investors, but many workers were disappointed with the returns given the performance of their 
own private investments.       
       
III. Data and Trends.  
 
  Our study relies on IRS Form 5500 filings for pension plans from 1988 through 2005.   
The research data files that we use include the universe of filings for plans with 100 or more 
participants, and a 5 percent sample of plans with less than 100 participants.    We restrict our 
sample to the universe of DC plans, but keep track of whether the firm also offers a DB plan. 7 
 
  Figure 1 presents the percentage of DC plans and participants with participant direction 
for the years 1988 through 2005.   A plan is classified as participant directed if there are 
individual accounts and employees can manage at least some (but not necessarily all) of the 
assets.
5    The increase in participant direction is dramatic.   Between 1988 and 2005, the 
percentage of plans with participant direction rose from 10 to 67 percent, and the percentage of 
participants with participant direction rose from 15 to 86 percent.
6   
  The growth of the 401(k) plan as a type of DC plan may have contributed to the growth 
of participant direction.   If a DC plan has a 401(k) feature, employees can contribute pre-tax 
dollars into the pension and they typically have control over their own contribution levels.  
Without the 401(k) feature, employee contributions are after-tax dollars.    If employers are more 
willing to give employees control over assets when they are contributing their “own money”, the 
growth of the 401(k) plan may have contributed to the growth of participant direction.   
  Figure 2 provides some evidence on whether the growth of the 401(k) plan can account 
for the rapid growth in participant direction.   While it is clear that DC plans are more likely to 
offer participant direction when there is a 401(k) feature, there has been rapid growth in 
participant direction regardless of whether the plan included the 401(k) option.    
  The growth in participant direction could be explained by two distinct phenomena:  First, 
existing pension plans could be switching from centrally managed funds to participant directed 
accounts.   Second, start up plans could be participant directed and/or plans that terminated may 
have been centrally managed.    To determine the relevant importance of these two phenomena, 
                                                 
5 According to the Form 5500 instructions prior to 1999, a plan should indicate that it is participant directed if it 
“provides for individual accounts and permits a participant or beneficiary to exercise independent control over the 
assets in his or her account.”    Starting in 1999, the Form 5500 provides 3 separate categories indicating whether the 
participant controls  none, some, or all of the assets.   Beyond 1999, we classify the latter two categories as 
participant directed plans. 
6 These estimates are weighted to reflect the fact that the small plans are a 5 percent sample. 8 
 
we calculate the percentage of plan participants with participant direction for plans started prior 
to 1988 versus those started 1988 or later.   The results, presented in figure 3, illustrate that the 
plans started in 1988 or later are slightly more likely to be participant directed than those that 
existed prior to 1988.  Nevertheless, even among the plans that existed prior to 1988, there has 
been a dramatic growth in participant direction.  Of the plans that were started prior to 1988, the 
percentage that was participant directed grew from 15 to 83 percent between 1988 and 2005.   
For plans that were started after 1988, the percentage participant directed grew from 16 to 90 
percent.  Hence, while start-ups are part of the explanation for the growing share of plans that are 
participant directed, much of the growth is due to older plans switching to participant direction.   
  Figure 4 presents a slightly different perspective on the issue of how start-ups affect the 
degree of participant direction.  It shows the trend in participant direction according to whether 
the plan was started prior to 1988, or whether it is a startup plan in a given year.   The difference 
between this and figure 4 is that start-up plans will appear in the data only in the year that they 
start up, whereas in figure 4, a plan started after 1988 appears in the data every year after it starts.   
Figure 4 makes it clear that start-up plans were only slightly more likely than older plans to be 
participant directed in any given year.   Moreover, there was a pronounced increase in the 
probability that a start-up plan would begin with participant direction since 1990.   Consequently, 
there is compelling evidence that the growth in participant direction since 1990 was the result of 
two factors: (1) old plans were switching to participant direction; and (2) start up plans became 
more likely to start as a participant directed plan.   
  9 
 
IV.  Empirical Analysis 
 
  In this section, we examine how pension plan features and worker characteristics 
influence the chance that an ongoing plan switches to participant direction, and the chance that a 
start up plan begins with participant direction.   Because large plans (100 or more participants) 
are sampled annually and provide more information on assets, income and expenses than small 
plans, our analysis is based upon the large plans.   While restricting analysis to the large plans 
could bias our conclusions, it is worth noting that the shift to participant direction has been 
similar in both the small and large plans, though large plans are slightly more likely to be 
participant directed (see figure 5).   
  To investigate what determines the chance that on-going pension plans switch to 
participant direction, we estimate a hazard model.   In our analysis, the hazard rate represents the 
probability of switching to participant direction conditional upon being a centrally managed fund 
in the prior year.   To examine the determinants of the hazard rate, we estimate a Cox 
proportional hazards model which assumes that the hazard rate of switching plan i to participant 
direction in period t is  
           exp        
where hit is the hazard rate, h0t  is the baseline hazard for all plans in period t, and Xit is a vector 
of  characteristics describing plan i in period t.   We measure all the control variables as 
deviations from means so that the baseline hazard rate can be considered as an estimate of the 
hazard rate for the average pension plan in the sample.
7    This specification allows the 
                                                 
7 Since the hazard rate is            exp        where h0t is the baseline hazard, if Xit is measured as a deviation from 
mean,            because           0 and exp          1 .      10 
 
characteristics X to shift the hazard rate for a given pension plan up or down relative to the 
baseline hazard rate depending upon whether   is positive or negative.      
  Table 1 summarizes the means of the control variables included in our analysis.   The 
plan characteristics are drawn from the Form 5500 data.   Since the Form 5500 provides limited 
information about the plan participants, we estimate the average level of education and real 
income for pension-eligible private sector workers  at firms with 100 or more workers in each 3-
digit industry using data from the March Current Population Surveys between 1989 and 2002. 
In addition to worker characteristics, our analysis controls for several plan characteristics 
that could influence the likelihood of switching to participant direction.  For example, we expect 
that when employees contribute a larger share of the funds into the pension plan that they would 
be more likely to pressure the employer to give them control of the funds.   Working in the 
opposite direction, when employers want their workers to invest in the company stock, we expect 
that the employer will be less willing to allow a switch to participant direction since the workers 
may divest themselves of the stock. 
  Collective bargaining could affect the demand for participant direction in a few ways.  
First, as noted by Freeman and Medoff (1984), unionization places greater weight on the 
“median” than the “marginal” worker in the determination of compensation, resulting in the 
compensation package being tilted towards the preferences of senior workers.  It is unclear, 
however, how this would alter worker demand for participant direction.   Collective bargaining 
might also create “voice” effects whereby the pension fund would have better information on the 
preferences of the workers in terms of asset allocation, thus reducing the demand for participant 
direction.   Finally, collective bargaining could proxy for worker characteristics in terms of their 11 
 
financial sophistication.   Unionized workers, on average, are less educated and this could lower 
demand for participant direction.
8    
  A pension plan that is performing poorly relative to the rest of the market could cause 
workers to pressure for control over the assets.   To control for this, we include the difference 
between the plan’s rate of return in a given year and the average return earned by all DC plans in 
the same year.  The pension’s annual rate of return is estimated using the approach described in 
McCarthy and Turner (1989).    
 
Factors influencing switch to participant direction. 
 
  Figure 6 presents the baseline hazard rate for 1991 through 2005.   Over the 15 year 
period, the average hazard rate for a switch to participant direction is 8.3%.  There is a 
significant spike in the hazard rate in 1999 where it peaks at approximately 16 percent.   This 
spike could be the result of two phenomena.  First, as described earlier in our description of the 
data, the question about participant direction was changed on the Form 5500 in 1999.   This 
change in the question could have contributed to the spike since prior to 1999,  it is unclear how 
plans where participants controlled some (but not all) of the assets self-reported their participant 
direction status.   After 1999, plans are specifically asked whether participants control none, 
some, or all of the assets.   We count any plan where participants control at least some of the 
assets as participant directed.     
                                                 
8 As an example, our own analysis of the April 1993 Current Population Survey data reveals that, among workers 
with a DC plan, the percentage with at least a college degree is much lower among unionized workers (13.5 versus 
33.6 percent).   12 
 
 The other major factor that could contribute to the spike in 1999 is that this is the first 
year that the Form 5500 data was entered using electronic scanning.   There is anecdotal 
evidence suggesting that the first attempt at electronic scanning may have led to more “noise” in 
the 1999 data, and our own analysis of the data supports that conclusion.    We cleaned the data 
on participant direction status by requiring that a plan be participant directed for two consecutive 
periods as a check of whether it was a true switch or simply noise.   The baseline hazard rate and 
estimated coefficients are based upon the “cleaned” data.      
In the first column of table 2, we present estimates of the hazard model for switching to 
participant direction.  The control variables explaining a switch toward participant direction are 
based upon the previous period’s values.  For example, the hazard rate for a switch between 1990 
and 1991 is modeled as a function of the plan characteristics in 1990.   A given coefficient 
reveals the percentage effect of a one-unit change in the control variable on the pension plan’s 
hazard rate relative to the baseline hazard.  For example, a coefficient of .1 on a variable implies 
that a one unit increase in the variable increases the hazard rate by 10 percent of the baseline 
hazard.   
  The hazard model estimates reveal several important determinants of whether a plan 
switches to participant direction.   First, plans that underperform relative to the market in the 
previous year are more likely to switch to participant direction.   If underperformance relative to 
the market increases by 10 percentage points, the hazard rate of switching to participant direction 
increases by 5.4 percent.
9   
                                                 
9 Evaluated at the sample mean, the average hazard rate over the period is .083.  Consequently, a 5.4 percent 
increase in the hazard rate implies that the hazard rate for a plan with the average characteristics increases by 0.45 
percentage points. 13 
 
  Not surprisingly, investments in employer securities substantially reduce the chance of a 
switch to participant direction.  A 10 percentage point increase in the share of assets invested in 
employer stock reduces the hazard rate of a switch to participant direction by 13.9 percent.   
  The size of the plan has negligible and statistically insignificant effects on the probability 
of switching to participant direction.  Per capita assets also have no statistically significant effect.  
Consequently, it does not appear as though scale economies in the administration of individual 
accounts are sufficient to have much of an influence on the decision to switch to participant 
direction – at least among plans with 100 or more participants. 
  A collectively bargained plan is 40 percent less likely to switch to participant direction.  
As discussed earlier, unions could affect the demand for participant direction in several different 
ways, and we are not able to distinguish between the competing explanations here.  Nevertheless, 
it is clear that collectively bargained plans are much less likely to give control of the pension 
assets to the workers.   
  We also examine a start-up plan’s decision of whether to offer participant direction.   
There are nearly 37,000 DC plans that start over the 1988-2005 time period.   As noted above, 
the percentage that started with participant direction rose rapidly over time.  In the second 
column of table 2, we present estimates of a probit model of the decision to start with participant 
direction.   The control variables are more limited than in the hazard analysis and represent 
contemporaneous (not lagged) values.  We also include year dummies in the analysis.   The 
reported coefficients represent the marginal effect of a one unit change in the corresponding 
variables on the probability that participant direction is chosen at start-up.  All estimates are 
evaluated at the sample mean. 14 
 
  The results are generally consistent with those in the hazard models.  For example, plans 
in industries with a more educated work-force and those with a larger share of contributions 
coming from the employees are more likely to start as participant directed plans.    Also, greater 
investments in employer securities reduce the chance that a plan chooses participant direction.    
There are two statistically significant results that conflict with those found in the hazard model 
estimation. First, increases in real income tend to reduce the probability that a plan starts as a 
participant directed plan.   The magnitude of this effect is quite small in economic terms, 
however, as the estimates imply that a $10,000 increase in average income for workers in the 
industry reduces the probability that a start up chooses participant direction by only .03.  Second,  
firms with DB plans are less to start plan that is participant directed. 
  One issue that we have not been able to address is the extent to which clarification of the 
requirements for satisfying section 404(c) stimulated the growth of participant direction.   
Unfortunately, Form 5500 did not collect information on whether a plan is filing for 404(c) 
protection until 1999.  Table 3 presents the statistics on 404(c) protection for participant directed 
plans with 100 or more participant since 1999. 
Among large plans, there is a significant fraction of plans that do not have 404(c) 
protection, though the percent with protection has been rising.   In 1999, only 47 percent of 
participant directed plans had 404(c) protection; by 2005, this had grown to 77 percent of plans.   
Consequently, it appears that a large number of pension plans were switching to participant 
direction in the 1990s without 404(c) protection.   While clarification of the requirements for 
404(c) protection in 1992 may have contributed to the growth of participant direction, it was 




Effects of Participant Direction on Contributions and Asset Management. 
  The last issue we address is how a switch to participant direction affects contributions to 
the plan and how assets are managed.   Using two cross-sectional data sets, Papke (2003a) 
estimates that participant direction increases employee contributions by approximately 3 percent 
of salary.   Her paper acknowledges the possibility that participant direction could be 
endogenous in the contribution equation, but notes the difficulty in finding appropriate 
instruments.    In a subsequent paper, Papke (2003b) uses cross sectional data and specifically 
addresses the endogeneity issue.   Using two-stage least squares to correct for endogeneity of 
participant direction increases the estimated effect of participant direction on contributions from 
3 to 9 percent of salary.  The validity of her two-stage approach relies upon the assumption that 
firm size is an appropriate instrument for participant direction in the contribution equation.   
Statistical evidence is presented supporting the validity of the instruments. 
  While two-stage approaches can correct for the potential endogeneity of participant 
choice, the results can be sensitive to the chosen instruments.   An alternative method is to use 
panel data to difference out any plan specific characteristics that are correlated with both 
participant direction status and the level of contributions.    That is, for example, suppose that 
greater employee financial sophistication leads to both increased contributions and greater 
demand for participant direction.   If financial sophistication is not controlled for in the 
contribution regression, the estimated effect of participant direction on contributions will be 
biased upwards.   Panel data allows us to control for fixed effects representing unobserved saving 
traits of the participants and eliminate any such bias.   16 
 
  To investigate whether a lack of control for fixed effects biases the conclusions about the 
effect of a switch to participant direction on several pension outcomes, we present regression 
estimates with and without plan fixed effects in table 4.   The regression models include controls 
for worker and plan characteristics, but only the coefficient on the participant direction dummy is 
reported.    In every regression estimated, the fixed effects are statistically significant at the .01 
level and thus we consider it to be the preferred specification.   
The first outcome of interest is the effect of participant direction on the level of 
contributions.    According to the OLS model, participant direction increases per capita employee 
contributions by $1,015.  When plan fixed effects are added, the effect drops to $222 but remains 
statistically significant at the .01 level.   The fact that the estimated effect of participant direction 
drops to less than one-fourth of its original value when plan fixed effects are included suggests 
that the plans with unobserved characteristics associated with greater employee contributions are 
more likely to adopt participant direction.    Such a result seems reasonable if, for example, more 
financially sophisticated employees are likely to both save more and are more likely to receive 
control over their pension assets.   
While participant direction increases employee contributions, it has a small but 
statistically significant negative effect on employer contributions.   In the model with plan fixed 
effects, participant direction is estimated to reduce employer contributions by $33 per 
participant.    Overall, our estimates suggest that a switch to participant direction would increase 
total contributions (employer + employee) by $189 annually.    
  Our estimates of the effect of participant direction on contributions are much smaller than 
those found in earlier work.   Since average per capita contributions in our sample are $2,925, a 
$189 increase in contributions represents a 6.5% increase in contribution levels.   On the other 17 
 
hand, the estimates in Papke (2003a) suggest that mean contribution levels (as a percentage of 
salary) would increase by 3.3 percentage points.   Since the mean contribution rate in Papke’s 
study is 4.7 percent of salary, her estimates suggest that participant direction would increase 
contributions over by 70 percent – over  ten times our estimated effect from the model with plan 
fixed effects.   On the other hand, if we remove the plan fixed effects, our estimated effects are 
closer (a 26 percent increase in contributions), but still substantially below her estimates.   
There are a few possible explanations for our much smaller effects of participant 
direction on contributions.  First, unlike earlier studies, we have panel data and controlling for 
plan-level fixed effects significantly reduces the estimated effect of participant direction.    A 
study using cross-sectional data cannot control for plan-level fixed effects and may thus over-
state the effect of participant direction on contributions.  Second, the estimates could be sensitive 
to the sample.   The cross-sectional data used in Papke (2003a) are from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women and the Health and Retirement Study which include 
older workers (over 45 in the NLS and 51-61 in the HRS) than in the general population.  It is 
possible that these older workers have greater response elasticities.  Also, her data is from the 
early 1990s when participant direction was just beginning, whereas our data spans 1989 through 
2005.   Finally, our estimates are based upon plan-level data, whereas she uses individual 
participant level data.   
The remainder of table 4 investigates the effect of participant direction on the type of 
assets held.   It is important to note that the Form 5500 data is not well suited for analyzing how 
the plan is divided between broad asset categories like stocks and bonds.   The reason is that 
many pension plans use outside asset managers, such as an insurance company, a bank trust, or a 
registered investment company.  Assets in such accounts are not broken down on the Form 5500 18 
 
into stocks and bonds.   Information on stock and bond holdings is reported only when the assets 
are managed by the pension plan.   The one exception, however, is the employer’s own stock.   
Such asset holdings are usually listed on the Form 5500 as a separate category because they are 
rarely included in the assets managed by outside contractors.  The Form 5500 data also provides 
good information on whether the money is managed internally, or whether the task is outsourced 
to an insurance or registered investment company.  
The regression analysis of the share of pension assets in the various categories reveals 
that a switch to participant direction leads to a significant increase in the use of outside asset 
managers.   According to the models with plan fixed effects, participant directed plans have 14 
percent more of their assets in trusts, 9 percent more in registered investment companies and 1 
percent more in insurance companies.    These changes are offset by a reduction in the plan’s 
holdings of stocks and bonds.     The fact that pension plans increase their use of these outside 
asset managers when they switch to participant direction is not surprising.   These outside asset 
managers have the infrastructure necessary to deal with individual account management and 
daily valuation.   There are undoubtedly economies of scale in the administration of such 
activities, and it is no surprise that pensions attempt to take advantage of such by using outside 
contractors.   
The final outcome we investigate is the impact of a switch to participant direction on 
investments in employer stock.   The model with fixed effects suggests that the share of assets 
invested in employer stock drops 6.1 percentage points with a switch to participant direction.   
As noted earlier, this is one reason that firms may be reluctant to switch to participant direction 
since it may want employees to hold employer stock in their pension for agency reasons.    It is 
worth noting, however, that a firm could still force employees to hold employer stock by giving 19 
 
them control over only part of the assets in the pension plan – for example, control over the 
employee contributions, but not the employer’s.     
Since 1999, the Form 5500 provides information on whether the pension plan has all or 
only some of the assets under participant direction.   As of 2005, 95 percent of the participant 
directed plans gave employees control over all the assets in the plan.   However, among plans 
that reported holdings of some employer securities, only 65 percent of plans gave employees 
control over all assets.   Consequently, some employers allow employees to self-direct some of 
the assets, but simultaneously require that a portion of the plan be held as employer securities. 
  
V. Summary and Conclusions. 
 
  This paper investigates the dramatic growth in participant direction that has occurred over 
the past 20 years.   We find that several factors influence the chance that an ongoing plan or a 
start-up will give control over the assets to the employees.  First, when the plan is 
underperforming relative to the market, an on-going plan is more likely to switch to participant 
direction.  Second, as the employees’ share of total contributions increases, existing plans are 
more likely to switch to participant direction and start-up plans are more likely to choose 
participant direction at start-up.   We also find evidence that when the pension is collectively 
bargained or has greater investments in employer stock, the pension is less likely to give control 
to the participants. 
  Some have suggested that the clarification of requirements for satisfying section 404(c) 
may be largely responsible for the growth in participant direction.  While it undoubtedly played a 
role, we find nearly one-half of large participant directed plans in 1999 did not seek 404(c) 20 
 
protection.   Consequently, factors other than 404(c) must have played an important role in the 
transition to participant direction.   We believe that the improved technology suited for 
administering individual accounts and the rapid growth of the mutual fund industry facilitated 
the growth.   We admit, however, that we are unable to quantify the effects of these changes on 
the growth of participant direction. 
  When a plan switches to participant direction, employees increase their contributions.   
However, we find much smaller effects than earlier studies, perhaps because we are able to 
control for plan level heterogeneity of employees using panel data.   We also find that a switch to 
participant direction causes a shift out of employer securities, though employers might try to 
prevent a flight from their securities by giving employees only partial control of assets. 
  In conclusion, the switch to participant direction over the past 20 years has been dramatic 
and we have presented some evidence on its causes and consequences.   An important question 
which remains unanswered is what the long run consequences of this change will be for 
retirement income adequacy.   That is, for example, will this shift in the responsibility for 
managing the assets lead to greater pension wealth at retirement.   The answer to this depends 
upon how well participants manage the assets and the effect of the shift to individual accounts on 
the overall return on pension assets. 
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Deviation from Mean Rate of Return   0.002 
Plan Age (in years)  15.58 
% of Assets in Employer Securities  10.6% 
%  401(k) Plan  43.1% 
Real Wage Income (in 1000s of $2003)  41.9 
Years of School  13.4 
Per-capita Assets (in 1000s of $2003)  25.4 
Employee’s Share of Contributions 29.7% 
Union Plan  10.9% 
Firm Also Offers a DB plan  20.9% 
Number of Participants   1,027 
  
# of observations  156,480 



























Table 2.    Factors Influencing the Participant Direction among Ongoing and Start-up Plans.  
Variable  Determinants of Hazard Rate of 
Switching to Participant Direction 
Probit Estimates of 
Determinants of 
Participant Direction for 
Starting Plans 
Deviation From Mean Rate of Return  -0.542***  -- 
(-6.36)   
Plan Age  -0.0250***  -- 
(-13.0)   
(Plan Age)
2  0.000323***  -- 
(11.4)   
% of Assets in Employer Securities  -1.394*** -0.429*** 
(-10.8) (-17.2) 
401k Plan  0.848***  0.312*** 
(20.9) (33.5) 
Real Income (in 1000s of 2003$)  0.00178 -0.00251*** 
(0.90) (-8.69) 
Years of School  0.0694*** 0.0573*** 
(2.74) (15.0) 
Per capita Assets (in 1000s)  -0.00265  -0.0000200 
(-0.059) (-1.34) 
Employee Share of Contributions  0.268*** 0.332*** 
(8.00) (41.8) 
Union Plan  -0.405*** -0.00824 
(-4.28) (-0.84) 
Employer Offers DB plan   0.0877***  -0.125*** 
(2.85) (-18.1) 
1000s of Participants   0.00242  0.00372*** 
(0.77) (2.59) 
(1000s of Participants)
2  -0.000008 -0.00000660 
  (-0.78)  (-1.31) 
Sample Size  156,480 
 
36, 977 





Table 3.  Percentage of Plans with 404(c) Protection.
a 
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Per capita employee contributions





        





138,764    715,215 
        
Share of assets in trusts  0.314  0.138  140,989     735,243 
 (316)  (98.9)     
        
Share of assets in insurance 
companies  
0.0424 0.0132  140,989  735,243 
(79.2) (15.9)   
        
Share of assets in Registered 
Investment Companies 
0.155  0.093  140,989     735,243 
(148) (67.2)     
        
Share of assets in employer stock
c   -0.423  -0.061  13,865  99,272 
   (-180)  (23.9)     
        
a The reported coefficients are from a regression of the various dependent variables on a participant direction 
dummy.   Each regression also includes controls for the age of the plan,  whether the plan is unionized, number of 
participants, industry specific measures of real income and education, and whether the firm also offers a defined 
benefit plan.   Sample restricted to large plans (100+ participants).  T-statistics are in parentheses.  
b  Measured in 2003 dollars.  Sample excludes plans in the top and bottom one percent of employer and employee 
per capita contributions  and those missing information necessary to derive employee share of contributions. 
c  Sample restricted to plans that had nonzero holdings of employer stock in at least one sample  year. 
d The plan fixed effects are statistically significant at the .01 level in all specifications presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
 